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Nous montrons que la possibilité qu'ont, ou non, les entreprises
d'observer leurs choix technologiques respectifs a des impacts significatifs sur les
technologies qu'elles adopteront à l'équilibre. Selon les caractéristiques de
l'industrie, la valeur stratégique de la flexibilité technologique peut être positive ou
négative, et il est parfois préférable d'observer plutôt que d'être observé, parfois plus
profitable d'être observé que d'observer.
We show that whether observing technological choices made by
competitors is possible or not has significant impacts on the equilibrium technological
configurations. Depending upon the industry characteristics, the strategic value of
technological flexibility may be either positive or negative, and it is sometimes better
to observe than to be observed, and sometimes to be observed than to observe.
Mots Clés : Flexibilité, observabilité, duopole
Keywords : Flexibility, observability, duopoly
JEL : D43, L13
1 INTRODUCTION
In a recent issue of this journal, Boyer and Moreaux (1997) [BM] studied
the choice of exible manufacturing systems in a duopoly framework
in which the technological decisions, typically long run decisions, are
taken in the rst stage, whereas the output decisions, typically short
run decisions, are taken in the second stage. They assumed that, before
choosing its level of production, each rm could observe the long run
technological choice of its rival and they showed how exibility choices
depended on six industry characteristics: the expected size of the market
(), the variability in the level of demand (V ), the dierential investment
cost for a exible technology (H), the slope of the demand function
(), the capacity of an inexible factory (x) and the marginal cost of
production (c).
They argued that low market volatility combined with intermediate
market size favored inexible technologies; that large values of either
volatility or size favored exible technologies; and that low or intermedi-
ate values of both favored the coexistence of exible and inexible tech-
nologies. They also showed the possibility of exibility traps in which
the rms choose exible technologies while they could both make more
prots by choosing inexible ones. Such traps could appear in industries
characterized by low volatility and intermediate size. Finally, they char-
acterized the paths of technological exibility adoption: rst, as function
of market size increases, holding constant the volatility of demand, and
then as function of demand volatility increases, holding constant the
expected size of the market.
In this paper, we study the relaxation of the assumption that rms
can observe the choice of technologies made in the rst stage before com-
petition in production levels takes place. We will show how observability
of technological choices aect the equilibrium conguration of technolo-
gies. Studying the role of observability has two objectives: rst, there
exist industries where it is not easy to observe the technological choice
of one's competitor; second, the comparison between these two polar
cases will allow us to clearly dene and measure the strategic value of
exibility.
When each rm's technological choice is observed by its rival (in the
closed loop game { CL), that choice can act as a credible commitment
to a particular production behavior in the second stage. Two factors
then inuence the choice of the technological exibility level: the chosen
technology should be well adapted to the expected size and volatility
of demand, the eciency factor, but the chosen technology could also
inuence the production behavior of the competitor in the second stage,
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the strategic factor. When technological choices are not observed (in the
open loop game { OL), the strategic factor above does not appear. As
suggested by Vives (1989), the comparison of equilibria obtained under
the two observability conditions will allow us to characterize the strategic
value of exibility
We recall the BM model in section 2 and we proceed with the com-
parison of the OL and CL game frameworks in section 3. Section 4 is
devoted to an intermediate case where one and only one rm observes
the technological choice of its rival. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
2 THE MODEL
As mentioned above, BM propose a two stage duopoly game in which the
rms choose simultaneously their respective technology in the rst stage
and compete a la Cournot in the second stage, once the technological
choices have been observed. Demand is linear and represented by p =
maxf0;    Qg where  is a random variable distributed over the
interval [; ], with mean  and variance V and  large enough to allow
both rms to be active in the second period.
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The value of  is assumed
to be observed by both rms before production takes place. Only two
technologies are available, with i standing for the inexible technology
and f for the exible technology. The inexible technology can only be
used to produce at full capacity q = x at a total variable cost cx while
the exible technology can be used to produce any quantity q  0 at a
total variable cost of cq. The dierential investment cost between the
exible and the inexible technologies is H , the cost of the inexible
technology being set at 0 for simplicity. The rst stage subgame perfect
payos are given by:

1
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1
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See Boyer, Jacques and Moreaux (1998b) for a model allowing bankruptcy.
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3 THE COMPARISON OF CL AND OL
GAMES
The CL game is analyzed by BM and their main results are summarized
in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the CL game
are as follows:
a) both rms choose inexible technologies if
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b) both rms choose exible technologies if
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c) one rm chooses the exible technology and the other the inexible
technology if
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d) both rms choose the same technology, either exible or inexible,
if
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In the OL game, rms do not observe the technological choice of their
competitor and therefore it is as if each rm chooses simultaneously in
stage 1 a technology and a production decision function to be applied in
stage 2 after observing the state of demand parameter . The relevant
strategies are as follows.
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{ If a rm is exible and expects its competitor to be exible, it
produces q() =
 c
3
in the second stage; we call this strategy
S1 : (f; q =
 c
3
).
{ If a rm is exible and expects its competitor to be exible and to
beleive that the rm is inexible, the rm produces q() =
+x c
4
in the second stage; we call this strategy S4 : (f; q =
+x c
4
).
{ If a rm is exible and expects its competitor to be inexible,
then it produces q() =
 x c
2
in the second stage; we call this
strategy S2 : (f; q =
 x c
2
).
{ If a rm is inexible, it can only produce at q = x in the second
period, whatever the technology of the other rm; we call this
strategy S3 : (i; q = x).
We will show that three equilibria are possible in the OL game: (S1; S1),
(S2; S3) (and the symmetric (S3; S2)) and (S3; S3). In any other case,
at least one rm would not be on its best reply. We must characterize
the best response function BR() of a rm to dierent strategy choices
of its competitor.
The best response to S1 : (f; q =
 c
3
).
If rm 2 plays S1, then rm 1 can be exible with strategy S1 or be
inexible with strategy S3. If rm 1 plays S3, then
q
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Given (1), S1 = BR(S1) i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(5)
The best response to S2 : (f; q =
 x c
2
).
If rm 2 plays S2, then rm 1 can be inexible with strategy S3 or
be exible with strategy S4. If rm 1 plays S4, then
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Given (2), S3 = BR(S2) i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The best response to S3 : (i; q = x).
If rm 2 plays S3, then rm 1 can be exible with strategy S2 or be
inexible with strategy S3. Given (3) and (4), we have S2 = BR(S3) i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1
4
h
V + (  3x   c)
2
i
 H  0 (7)
Condition (7) turns out to be the condition under which inexibility
is the best response to inexibility in the CL game. Hence, the possi-
bility to observe or not the technological choice of the other rm does
not aect this condition and therefore the equilibrium (i; i) emerges for
eciency reasons only and not for strategic reasons. These results are
summarized in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the OL game
are as follows:
a) both rms choose exible technologies if
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b) one rm chooses the exible technology and the other the inexible
technology or both rms choose exible technologies if
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c) one 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exible technology and the other the inexible
technology if
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d) both rms choose inexible technologies if
1
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h
V + (  3x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2
i
 H:
The equilibria for the CL and the OL games are represented on Figure
1 with parameter values  = 1; x = 1; c = 0:2; and H = 0:1 (the
minimum value of  allowing both rms to be active in the second stage
is then 2.2).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
We obtain 8 dierent regions in the (; V )-space:
{ In A: the CL equilibrium is (i; i); the OL equilibrium is (i; i).
{ In B: the CL equilibrium is (i; f) [(f; i)]; the OL equilibrium is (i; f)
[(f; i)].
{ In C: the CL equilibrium is (i; f) [(f; i)]; the OL equilibria are (i; f)
[(f; i)] and (f; f).
{ In D: the CL equilibrium is (i; f) [(f; i)]; the OL equilibrium is (f; f).
{ In E: the CL equilibrium is (f; f); the OL equilibrium is (f; f).
{ In F: the CL equilibrium is (f; f); the OL equilibria are (i; f) [(f; i)]
and (f; f).
{ In G: the CL equilibrium is (f; f); the OL equilibria are (i; f) [(f; i)].
{ In H: the CL equilibria are (i; i) and (f; f); the OL equilibrium is (i; i).
The structure of the equilibria of the OL game is as follows. If the
volatility of demand V is low and the capacity x of an inexible factory is
close to the quantity chosen by a duopoly in a competition a la Cournot,
then the inexible technology is chosen by both rms. If V increases or
if x moves away from the Cournot equilibrium quantity, then one of the
two rms adopts the exible technology. If V increases even more or if
x moves even farther from the Cournot equilibrium quantity, then the
other rm adopts a exible technology too. However, there are zones
where the OL game accepts several types of equilibria: in C and F, we
have two equilibria, namely (i; f) [(f; i)] and (f; f). Multiple equilibria
appear because a exible rm can play two dierent strategies, S1 and
S2. In these zones, S1 = BR(S1) but S3 = BR(S2) so the best response
to exibility depends on the production decision function followed by the
exible rm.
The comparison between equilibria of the CL game and equilibria
of the OL game shows two particularly interesting zones where the CL
and OL games result in dierent technological congurations for the
industry. In zone D on Figure 1 the equilibrium of the CL game is (i; f)
[(f; i)] and the equilibrium of the OL game is (f; f). In the CL game, one
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rm chooses inexibility for strategic reasons. However, if its competitor
could not observe its technological choice, the rm would choose a exible
technology. In that zone, the capacity x of an inexible rm is larger than
the expected production level of a exible rm. By choosing inexibility,
a rm can therefore commit to produce more in the second stage of the
game, hence reducing in equilibrium the expected production of the other
rm: the strategic value of exibility is negative in region D. In region
G, the equilibrium of the CL game is (f; f) while the equilibrium in the
OL game is (i; f) [(f; i)]. In this region, the expected production level
of a exible rm is larger than the capacity x of an inexible one. By
choosing exibility, a rm increases its expected production level in stage
2 and therefore decreases the expected production of the other exible
rm: the strategic value of exibility is positive in region G. There are
two other zones (C and F) where we can observe similar dierences but
in these two zones, the OL game accepts several equilibria, making the
comparison less striking.
The exibility trap present in region H in the CL game does not
appear in the OL game. In the CL game, if one rm is exible then
the other rm chooses exibility too: exibility is a best response to
exibility and (f; f) is therefore an equilibrium. In this region the ex-
pected production of a exible factory is greater than the capacity of
an inexible factory. So choosing exibility when the other rm is ex-
ible decreases the expected production of the other rm. However we
are in a exibility trap because both rms would be more protable in
the alternative (i; i) equilibrium. In the OL game, the strategic value of
exibility disappears since technological choices are not observable: the
best reply to exibility becomes inexibility and the only equilibrium is
(i; i). Hence, non observability prevents the occurrence of the exibility
trap.
The paths of technological exibility adoption, as either market size
or demand volatility increases, depend on the conditions of observability.
Using the approach of BM mutatis mutandis, we nd that the timing of
adoption may be advanced or postponed depending on the particular re-
gion considered. If the inexible factory capacity is large compared with
the expected size of the market, that is, if   3x + c, exibility has
a negative strategic value; therefore, as demand volatility increases, the
jump from an asymmetric exibility conguration to (f; f) happens ear-
lier in the OL game. If the inexible factory capacity is small compared
with the expected size of the market, that is, if   3x + c, exibility
has a positive strategic value and the jump from an asymmetric exi-
bility conguration to (f; f) is postponed in the OL game. Similarly,
as the market size grows for a given demand volatility level, the jump
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from (f; f) to (i; f) happens earlier while the jump from (i; f) to (f; f)
is postponed in the OL game.
4 THE ASYMMETRIC OBSERVATION
GAME
Let us now consider the intermediate case where rm 2 [rm 1] can [can-
not] observe the technological choice of rm 1 [rm 2] before playing the
Cournot competition stage 2 game. This game has no subgame. We
assume that for the second stage of the competition, rm 2 takes full
advantage of its information set. This implies that: the best response
test for rm 1 playing OL strategies is the set of conditions given for
the CL strategies; the best response test for rm 2 playing CL strategies
is the set of conditions given for the case of OL strategies (see section
3 above).
2
With this set of best replies, we obtain the following asym-
metric observability equilibria which can also be represented on Figure 1:
{ In A and H, the equilibrium is (i; i).
{ In B and C, equilibria are (i; f) and (f; i).
{ In D, the equilibrium is (i; f).
{ In E, the equilibrium is (f; f).
{ In F, the equilibria are (f; i) and (f; f).
{ In G, the equilibrium is (f; i).
In regions A, B and E, equilibria are the same in the OL and CL games;
so they do not change in asymmetric observability case. In area C, the
equilibria of the asymmetric observability game are the same as in the
CL game. The conguration (f; f) which is an equilibrium in the OL
game is not an equilibrium in the asymmetric observability game. If
rm 2 chooses exibility then rm 1 chooses inexibility which induces
rm 2 to decrease its production in most states of demand. In region
D, the unique equilibrium of the asymmetric observability game is (i; f).
One may wonder then whether the best position in this region D is to
observe or be observed. The answer depends on the parameter values;
for low volatility, the best technology is the inexible one and it is there-
fore better to be observed than to observe; but for high volatility, the
best technology is the exible one and it is therefore better to observe
2
Boyer, Jacques and Moreaux (1998a) give more justications about this denition
of a robust equilibrium in this kind of situation.
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than be observed.
3
In region F, there are two Nash equilibria of the
asymmetric observability game, namely (f; f) and (f; i) and it is better
to be exible than inexible. It is therefore better to be observed than
to observe. In region G, there is an unique Nash equilibrium (f; i). The
best technology is the exible one and therefore, as in area F, it is bet-
ter to be observed. In region H, the unique equilibrium is (i; i). The
fact that one of the rm does not observe its competitor's technological
choice prevents the occurrence of the exibility trap. So this intermedi-
ate observability structure is protable for both rms in region H while
in regions D, F and G, one rm gains at the expense of the other one.
5 CONCLUSION
We have shown in this paper that whether observability of technological
choices is possible or not has signicant impacts on technological choices
and on the adoption timings of exible technologies as market grows or as
volatility of demand increases. We have been able to make more precise
the meaning of the strategic value of exibility and we showed that this
value can be positive or negative depending on the industry parameters.
In contexts where one and only one rm observes the technological choice
of its competitor, we showed that it is sometimes better to observe than
be observed and sometimes better to be observed than observe. This
might be the basis of a theory of industrial intelligence understood as a
deliberate attempt at observing the choices of the competitor as well as
at making one's choices exposed to the eyes of the competitor.
3
The equation of the border of these two zones is:
1
4

V + (  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
 
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2
x (  x  c) H = 0:
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